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What makes us human, what sets us
apart from other animal species, and
which traits do we share with our closest
living relatives? Ever since Darwin intro-
duced the notion of continuity in his
theory of evolution, humans have been
obsessed with the question of how to
distinguish themselves from all other
species. In the postwar period, our species
became known as ‘‘Man the Toolmaker,’’
until in the 1960s Jane Goodall watched
chimpanzees using sticks to fish for
termites, and that was that. We then
distinguished ourselves using the term
‘‘Man the Hunter,’’ but the discovery that
chimpanzees and other social carnivores
engage in coordinated hunts refuted this
type of collective action as the one decisive
feature. More recently, the issue of culture
has entered center stage. Trying to
distinguish the cultural ‘‘haves’’ from the
‘‘have-nots’’ tends to generate more heat
than light, and it seems much more
productive to think about the cognitive
prerequisites for social learning, attribu-
tion of mental states, and symbolic com-
munication.
In his book Why We Cooperate, Michael
Tomasello explores the socio-cognitive
mindset that forms the basis of human
sociality, including the creation of cultural
artifacts and social institutions. The key
message is that humans are fundamentally
helpful and cooperative, as evidenced by
infants’ willingness to provide information,
help, and share worldly goods. Later in
life, experience may corrupt this benevo-
lent attitude, but the core point for
Tomasello is that children exhibit other-
regarding preferences, and it is precisely
this feature that sets them apart from our
closest living relatives, the great apes.
Interest in the evolution of cooperation
and altruism and the proposition that
individuals do care about the well-being
of others are testimony to the major
paradigm shift in the current conception
of the evolution of social behavior. At the
height of radical Neo-Darwinism, individ-
uals were seen as manipulators who
benefited from modifying the behaviors
of others. Suspicion would be a particu-
larly useful attitude in an environment full
of bluffing, cheating, and free-riding. Over
the years, it has become clear that this
view did not cover many of the complex-
ities of human or other animal social life.
Recently, however, we have seen a
resurgence of the concept of ‘‘group
selection,’’ this time not in the simplistic
version that animals or humans act for the
good of the group, but that they do so
because it is in their own interest. If you
live in a successful group, this will increase
your own chances of survival. Thus, the
argument goes, selection takes place at
multiple levels, namely at the level of the
gene, the individual, and the group [1].
The issue, however, is far from settled, and
an alternative view is that kin selection
suffices to explain the emergence of
cooperation in groups [2].
The concise nature of Why We Cooperate
makes it a perfect companion for a train
ride. It is based on the Tanner Lectures
that Tomasello gave last year at Stanford
University. Tomasello is co-director of the
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany and
head of the Department of Developmental
and Comparative Psychology. Over the
last two decades, he and his collaborators
have rolled out an impressive research
program that centers on experimental
testing of children and captive great apes.
As Tomasello freely admits, the book is
heavily biased towards his own work.
There are two main chapters; in the first,
he turns to the building blocks of cooper-
ative behavior—sharing, helping, and
providing information. He examines these
from a comparative perspective and pro-
vides ample evidence that children go out
of their way to come to the aid of a
stumbling experimenter or point out to her
the location of a missing tool, while
chimpanzees rarely appear to grasp the
situation. The second chapter extends the
argument to the fundamentals of collabo-
rative action (the so-called ‘‘we-intention-
ality’’ [3]), explores possible evolutionary
scenarios for the emergence of this specific
human attitude and examines the forma-
tion of social norms and institutions. The
arguments flow nicely, and Tomasello
knows how to capture his audience.
Though at first there is a feeling that it
all adds up too well, what really makes this
book such a stimulating piece is the
commentary section, in which four emi-
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probe alternative perspectives.
Joan Silk stresses the importance of the
multidisciplinary approach. Game theory,
for instance, has proven a useful tool in the
analysis of evolutionary scenarios. Her
main point is that, in collaborative en-
deavors, interests are typically not fully
aligned (but not completely divergent,
either). Silk is an anthropologist who has
studied primates not only in the wild and
in the lab, but also in meeting rooms. As
she notes, anyone who has ever served on
a committee has experienced firsthand
how to grapple with misaligned interests.
Carol Dweck, a developmental psychol-
ogist, critically examines the notion that
one-year-old children constitute ‘‘naked
savages.’’ She makes the important point
that child socialization begins at birth and
that children very early on begin to form
hypotheses about what is expected of them
(see [4] for a beautiful account of cross-
cultural differences in babies’ first years). I
found this perspective particularly impor-
tant, as the majority of Tomasello’s work is
with white middle-class children whose
parents think that it is a good idea to get
them tested. Of interest may be how
sensitive these children are to the situation.
For instance, is their behavior influenced
by an understanding of the experimenters’
expectations? While it is commendable
that cross-cultural studies are under way, it
would be beneficial if these experimental
tests were complemented by observational
studies in order to explore what infants in
different cultures actually do in their real
lives.
The philosopher of science Brian
Skyrms provides a number of examples
where cooperation has evolved in species
without a mind, such as bacteria. Of
course, psychologists may dismiss the
study ‘‘cooperative bio-film production in
bacteria’’ precisely because these creatures
have no brains. These cases may, howev-
er, help to identify the minimal require-
ments needed for cooperative behavior.
Elizabeth Spelke, also an eminent
developmental psychologist, suggests that
there is some ‘‘core knowledge’’ about the
physical and social properties of the world
that is shared across cultures and, to some
extent, across species. She argues that
language is the means by which children
learn to relate different representational
formats and combine them productively.
So the question is whether language gives
rise to shared intentionality and other
forms of elaborate attribution of mental
states, as she would argue, or if Tomasello
is right in arguing that joint attention and
shared intentionality (in some crude form)
come first and pave the way for language.
The answer is still up for grabs.
Despite its modest format, the book
provides ample food for thought and could
well be used as a starting point in
discussion rounds and seminars. I would
issue a warning however, to be aware of
the limitations when comparing adult
captive apes with young of our own species
[5]. There is also an implicit connotation
that chimpanzees constitute models for the
last common ancestor of chimps and
humans, which should be taken with a
pinch of salt. This is not to say these
comparative analyses are of no value; after
all, chimpanzees and bonobos are our
closest living relatives.
So are we much better than we often
think we are? Are we really ‘‘born (and
bred) to help,’’ as the title of the first
chapter suggests? Tomasello points out
that a correlate of the ‘‘we-intentionality’’
is to value conformity. From a very early
age children do not only try to comply,
they also make an effort to get others to
comply as well. Humans have evolved
emotional responses to violations of social
norms, such as guilt and shame; we
actively teach and have invented a fright-
ening array of methods to punish and
torture. Tomasello advances the view that
the specific skills and motivations, which
make us help and share, evolved in times
of cooperative hunting. While I am not a
great friend of drafting evolutionary tales
of how or why certain traits evolved, I
would argue that these skills are equally
likely to have evolved in a setting of fierce
between-group competition. We will prob-
ably never know. The overriding conclu-
sion, however, is that cooperation and
competition mutually depend on each
other and that conformity and markers
of group membership are important in-
gredients in the evolution of human social
behavior.
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